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Patent law is under-theorized in the sense that the predominating incentive-based
justifications cannot by themselves adequately explain empirical evidence on
patenting gathered by research economists. This article provides an alternative
justification for patent law based on private transaction costs savings offered by
patent law in comparison to alternative options available to those who wish to
exploit information assets. In particular, it identifies striking parallels to corporate
law as described in recent scholarship and shows how patents act as affirmative
asset partitions and how they ameliorate significant team production
problems.Even if the patent system provides no significant incentives to invent, it
can be explained andjust fied in terms of transaction costs savings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent law needs a theoretical justification that better fits existing empirical data
on inventive activity, innovation, and the commercialization of new products.
Currently, incentive theories predominate: these theories assert that the prospect of
earning super-competitive profits provides necessary incentives for invention,
1
innovation,2 and disclosure.3 The reward of exclusive rights, it is assumed, will spur
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the 2003 IP Scholars conference at Tulane Law School, the Georgetown University Law Center IP
Colloquium, and the English IP Teachers Conference at the University of Western England,
Bristol.
1 Courts and commentators frequently describe patent law as providing incentives for
inventors to create. For some of the many discussions of the incentive-to-invent rationale, see
WARD BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAw 2-3 (1973); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303,307 (1980) (noting that patent law offers "inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an
incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts" (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974))). A recent search of the Westlaw JLR database for "incentive/s
invent! /s patent" returned 905 documents.
2 The incentive-to-innovate rationale focuses on the need to recover the costs necessary to
bring an invention to market. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER, INNOvATION AND GROWrH:
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE (1984); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCIIJRE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rulesfor
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
creativity, productivity, and the dissemination of information. If the foregoing benefits
outweigh the costs of granting exclusive rights,4 then patent law would be justified in
the economic sense. As one influential commentator succinctly notes, the incentive
story has been "the model for 200 years."'5
Empirical data suggests, however, that the incentive model provides at best a
partial justification for the patent system. A comprehensive Brookings Institute study
of published data on patenting recently concluded: "Taken as a whole, the empirical
literature is inconclusive on the question of whether stronger patents increase or
decrease innovation."6 The literature canvassed in the Brookings study, along with
other influential and frequently cited studies,7 supports weak, strong, and
inconclusive correlations between patent scope and expenditures on research and
development. 8 The incentive story is further undermined by the growing consensus
that very few patents confer market power on their owners,9 a conclusion that
undermines both the cost and benefit sides of the economic analysis of patents. Weak
market power means weaker incentive benefits, but it also means that the public costs
of patenting may have been exaggerated. Finally, new patent pricing models reveal
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697,703--04 (2001); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents
and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 1017,
1036-37 (1989) ("The protection of a patent monopoly enhances the likelihood that a firm will be
willing to undertake [innovation]."); Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Doc.
WT/DS 1 14/R (WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, March 17, 2000) ("Patent laws establish a
carefully defined period of market exclusivity as an inducement to innovation ... "); see also Julie
S. Turner, Comment, The Nonmanufacturing Infringer: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 192 (1998) ("A comparison of the incentive-to-invent and the
incentive-to-innovate theories shows the waning of the former and the waxing of the latter.").
3 In order to receive a patent, inventors must fully disclose their invention to the public. See
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring a patent application to provide a written description that would
enable someone skilled in the relevant art to practice the invention). See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSrITUrION OF THE UNiTED STATEs § 1147 (1833) ("In short, the only
boon, which could be offered to inventors to disclose the secrets of their discoveries, would be the
exclusive right and profit of them, as a monopoly for a limited period.").
4 Some patents may allow owners to charge higher prices, restrict output, or stifle beneficial
follow-on innovation. See RiCHARD A. POSNER & WILUAM LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 57 (2003).
5 Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 139 (2000). See ROBERT W. HAHN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR
REGULATORY STUDIEs, THE ECONOMICs OF PATENT PROTECION: POucY IMPLucAON FROM THE
LrrERATURE 4 (2003) ("In general, classical theory supports a positive view-that patents, while
exacting a price from society, provide incentives to innovate.").
6 HAHN, supra note 5, at 2.
7 See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
8 See HAHN, supra note 5, at 2.
9 See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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the difficulty R&D managers have had in making ex ante valuations of patents' 0 and
therefore support studies finding that decision makers often do not rely on patents in
appropriating returns on anticipated investments." Although intuition tells us that the
prospect of acquiring exclusive rights must surely encourage research and
development, scholars have begun to suspect that the "incentive story as classically
told has some serious problems."'
12
In other words, the incentive theory incompletely justifies the patent system.
Recently, scholars have begun work on the project of constructing non-incentive
models tojustify the granting of patents. Clarisa Long, for example, argues that firms
patent in order to signal information to markets.' 3 For her, the patent system, wholly
apart from any invention or innovation it may induce, serves the important function of
lowering information costs to firms. 14 It provides a firm with a convincing means of
signaling to capital markets the strength of its R & D capacity and human capital, and
of attracting licensing opportunities. Other scholars, working roughly in what might
be called the New Institutional Economics, 15 have emphasized how patents enable
trading in information assets, stimulating a thicker market in technological
information. 16 Additionally, the early work of Edmund Kitch goes beyond incentive
theories by emphasizing the public cost savings of early patent grants. 7 This paper
10 See Russell F.R. Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and
the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175 (2004) (asserting novel
adaptation of Black-Scholes equation provides first accurate metric for patent pricing).
I1 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
12 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 148. See also Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Seigleman,
Toward an Integrated Theory oflntellectualProperty, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2002) ("WThere
exists a striking misfit between the academic theory of intellectual property and its use in the real
world.").
13 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U .CHu .L. REv. 625, 626-27 (2002).
'
4 1d. at 627.
15 Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1877 (2000) ("Property rights, firms, institutions, governments: all of these
are the subject of extensive study by social scientists operating within the NIE [New Institutional
Economics] framework. It is time to integrate the study of lPRs into this framework.").
16 See Nancy T. Gallini and Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory of Innovation, 16
RANDJ. ECON. 237,238 (1985) ("[B]y protecting property rights, patents here open the market for
trade in technological information"); James Anton & Dennis Yao, Expropriation andInventions:
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, 1 AM. ECON. REv., March 1994, at 190,
192 (analyzing how patents help solve Arrow's information paradox, enabling independent
inventors to negotiate with firms); Robert Merges, Expanding Boundaries ofthe Law: Intellectual
Property and the Cost of Commercial Exchange, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1590-91 (1995)
(discussing how intellectual property rights lower transaction costs).
17 See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977). Kitch assumes that patents will generate both rent seeking and innovation, so he has one
foot firmly in the incentive theory tradition, but his focus on how the patent registration system
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builds on existing non-incentive theories and proposes a powerful justification for
patent law based on private transaction costs savings. Given ambiguous empirical
support for the long-held incentive theory, the transaction costs theory and
complementary non-incentive theories provide an adequate economic justification for
patent law. Furthermore, even if empirical evidence were to show that the costs of
patenting and the value of stimulated innovation offset each other, the transaction
costs theory suggests that the patent registration system should nonetheless be
maintained as providing a net economic benefit.
In particular, patent law serves to lower transaction costs in ways previously
unidentified in the theoretical literature. By establishing a title registration system for
some sorts of information assets, patent ownership rules significantly reduce
transaction costs compared to the available alternative systems for protection: trade
secrecy and contract law. Instead of filing for a patent and complying with federal
disclosure requirements, a firm could choose instead to exploit information secretly
by taking physical precautions and binding employees, managers, licensees, potential
licensees, sources of venture capital, and other information transferees through a
complex web of contracts. Although previous commentators have noted some cost
savings associated with patenting,1 8 recent scholarship in the area of corporate law
has made possible the exposition of a more complete transaction costs rationale.
More specifically, theorists of the fimn have long sought to explain the law of
business organizations as providing legal structures as responses to situations where
contractual solutions are likely to be too costly.19 Similarly, the patent form can be
characterized as a legal structure designed to reduce costs associated with altemative
regimes. Critical in this regard is recent groundbreaking work by corporate law
scholars who have de-emphasized the role of limited shareholder liability and agency
costs in the development of the corporate form. Instead, the new scholarship describes
the corporation primarily as a superior response to (i) the need to shield the assets of
an enterprise from the creditors and heirs of those who invest in it ("affirmative asset
partitioning") 20 and (ii) the need to monitor shirking and opportunistic behavior when
the relative value of inputs and outputs of an enterprise are difficult to measure ("team
deters costly duplicative races to innovate and facilitates some transactions between firms
foreshadows more recent non-incentive theories.
18 See id. at 275-80.
19 See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297,298 (1978) (discussing when the likely appropriation
of quasi rents drives the vertical integration of the firm). Of course, the modem discussion of the
role of transaction costs in firm structure begins with R1H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
20 See Henry Hansmann & Rainier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L. J. 387, 393-95 (2000).
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production problems").21 Critical features of patent law can be explained as robust
responses to these two same concerns.
Part HI of this essay describes how the patent form facilitates affirmative asset
partitioning and ameliorates critical team production problems in contexts where trade
secrecy or contractual solutions entail significantly higher transaction costs. 22 Patent
theory has much to leam from how the problem of transaction costs is addressed in
the theory of the firm. Part mII demonstrates the power of the transaction costs theory
to explain prominent "patent paradoxes" identified in the empirical economic
literature on patenting. 23 Popular incentive theories are inadequate to explain, for
example, studies showing a low correlation between patenting rates and measures of
R&D spending by patenting firms. Incentive theories also imperfectly explain high
rates of patenting when the odds of a patent conferring market power are also very
low.24 The transaction costs theory is demonstrably more consistent with the body of
seemingly contradictory empirical data that has been collected over the last twenty-
five years. Part IV concludes by briefly noting the normative role of non-incentive
theories. Even if economists can never convince policymakers that the incentives to
create and innovate provided by patent law offset the costs imposed by the system,
25
21 See Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REv. 247, 249-51 (2001).
22 Connecting the law of business organizations to patent law may seem an unusual project,
but its historical roots go back over 380 years to the English Parliament's provision of monopoly
exemptions for both inventors andpublicly chartered companies in the Statute of Monopolies. See
An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures Thereof
(Statute of Monopolies), 1623, 21 Jam. 1, 3 (Eng.) (generally banning the Crown's practice of
granting monopolies, subject to several express exceptions). See also Malla Pollack, Purveyance
and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the
Takings Clause in the Public's Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 75-79 (2000).
Neither innovation nor invention was required for exempted monopoly grants. The statute ended
the abusive gifting by the Crown of monopolies to favored courtiers, but did not prevent grants to
business entities like the Hudson Bay Company or the East India Company. See also KENNETH R.
ANDREWS, TRADE, PLUNDER AND SET"LEmENT: MARITIME ENTERPRISES AND THE GENESIS OF THE
BRITISH EMPIRE, 1480-1630 (1984); SELECr CHARTERs OFTRADING COMPANIES 1530-1707 (Cecil
T. Carr ed. 1913). An incentive-to-invent or reward theory of patent law has difficulty explaining
the stunning breadth of this exception.
23 See infra notes 124-131 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
25 For the most famous statement of skepticism, see SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH
CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: STUDY No. 15 OF THE SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKs, AND COPYRIGHTS 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (reporting Fritz Malchup's
study).
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have
had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it ....
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the transaction costs rationale can be offered as an independent justification for the
system and one that may have serious implications for patent office reform.
11. CORPORATIONS AND PATENTS AS COST-REDUCING LEGAL FORMS
Business and corporate law present many different organizational options for
firms and individuals. In the abstract, no single organizational form is the most
attractive. Different commercial contexts and business exigencies drive a firm's
rational choice to operate as a sole proprietorship, a general partnership, a limited
partnership, a closely held corporation, or a publicly traded one. Likewise,
commercial exigencies (wholly apart from dreams of market power) also drive most
decisions whether to patent an invention. Clarisa Long, for example, suggests that
reducing information costs provides one important explanation for the decision to
patent.26 Even if a firm has no intention to use or license an invention, it may still
apply for a patent in order to signal the state of its R&D capacity, and the quality of its
human capital to other firms or capital markets.27 A close look at recent economic
scholarship on the corporate form suggests another explanation for patenting that does
not rely on a firm's prospects of obtaining market power-that the patent form
reduces important sorts of transaction costs.
A. The Corporate Form as Affirmative Asset Partition
Although standard corporate law texts still emphasize almost exclusively the
need for limited shareholder liability as the driving force behind the development of
the corporate form,28 recent commentary challenges the traditional story, and the
lessons for patent law are profound. Corporate law scholars Hansmann and
Kraakman take direct aim at the standard assertion that limited liability is what
primarily drives the corporate form.29 Although shielding shareholders from the
claims of corporate creditors, "defensive asset partitioning," 30 is admittedly relevant,
it is of "distinctly secondary importance."'31 Instead, they suggest that "[t]he truly
essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in effect, the reverse of limited liability-
namely, the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the
Id. "[Malchup's] study remains authoritative." Kitch, supra note 17, at 289 n.72.
26 See Long, supra note 13, at 626.
27 See id at 627-28 (arguing that the patent system allows firms to "choose to obtain and use
a portfolio of patent rights to signal information about themselves that would be more expensive to
convey through other means").
28 See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (2001); Blair & Stout,
supra note 21, at 247.
29 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 390.
30 Id. at 395-96.
31 Id. at 390.
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entity's owners or managers." 32 The value of the affirmative asset partition arguably
best explains the flourishing of the corporate form.
Imagine a group of investors seeking to build and operate a railroad. As a
partnership, their pool of assets remains constantly vulnerable to disruption. Heirs of a
deceased partner would have the right to withdraw the partner's proportional share of
the assets, and creditors of any partner might force liquidation of his or her assets in
the partnership. A legal form that shields a business enterprise from such disruption
would have distinct advantages in attracting capital and conducting the long-range
planning necessary to construct something like a railroad.33 Blair explores the history
of affirmative asset partitioning and notes that the primary reason given by the
Schuylkill Coal Company in its 1823 request to the Pennsylvania legislature for a
corporate charter was to 'have the real estate of the Company, consisting of the coal
lands which they hold ... exempted from the laws of succession or inheritance, which
govern cases of natural persons or individuals.' 34 Operating as a partnership would
have left the company vulnerable in the event of the death or bankruptcy of a partner.
The advantage of affirmative asset partitioning through incorporation is clear: "if
a shareholder becomes insolvent [or dies], the shareholder's personal creditors [or
heirs] cannot force liquidation of corporate assets to satisfy their claims upon
exhausting the shareholder's personal assets. Rather, a shareholder's creditors at most
can step into the shareholder's role as an owner of shares ... ."35 Asset partitions can,
in theory, be effected through contract law, but it is frequently too costly to negotiate
ex ante agreements with all parties who might potentially make claims through each
partner. The corporate form allows assets to be cheaply and easily placed beyond the
reach of parties who could otherwise interfere with the development of the enterprise.
As an essential part of the corporate form, the affirmative asset partition makes capital
easier to attract, stabilizes enterprise operations, and facilitates long-term planning.
The patent form provides similar advantages at a cost significantly lower than
contractual and trade secrecy alternatives.
32 Id.
33 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital What Corporate Law Achievedfor Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 397-98, 442 (2003).
34 Id. at 420 (quoting MANUEL EYRE ET AL., REMARKS AND OBSERVATIONS SHOWING THE
JUSTICE AND PoLIcY OF INCORPORATING "THE SCHUYLKIuL COAL COMPANY" 1-8 (Philadelphia
1823)). See also Paul Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the History of Corporate
Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 878-92 (2000) (exploring the historical roots of asset partitioning).
35 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 20, at 394 (noting also that obtaining shares
"offers the power to seek liquidation only when at least a majority of the firm's shareholders
agree").
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B. The Patent Form as Affirmative Asset Partition
To see how affirmative asset partitioning works in the context of information
assets, it helps to imagine a firm contemplating acquiring two distinct assets: an
automobile and a secret chemical formula. The automobile is a relatively stable and
risk-free investment. Its market price is easy to determine, and the local vehicle title
registration system greatly reduces the possibility that a competing claimant to the
auto will be able to prove post-transfer that it has superior title.36 The firm should be
relatively unconcerned, for example, about the creditors and heirs of the vehicle's
former owners. The title registration system partitions the vehicle in functionally the
same way as incorporation partitions a firm's assets from creditors and heirs of its
owners.
When acquiring the chemical formula as a trade secret, 37 the firm would like to
erect the same sort of partition from risk as is available with its motor vehicle assets.
In the absence of a patent, it will be very costly to acquire and hold the formula free
from outside interference. One problem stems from the fact that no one can record
title to a trade secret. 38 The acquiring firm, therefore, will have difficulty determining
whether the chemical formula can be legally transferred by the transferor. 39 The
transferor may have stolen the formula from a third party or obtained it in violation of
a duty of confidentiality. Determining the legal status of a trade secret is much more
complicated and costly than simply checking a state's online database of vehicle
registrations.
More importantly, even if the transferor of the secret has good "title," it remains
difficult to effect a post-transfer partition. Even after the firm acquires the chemical
formula, the transferor will almost certainly retain knowledge of it and therefore the
36 The firm would do well, of course, to check the relevant public records to make sure that
no one has taken the vehicle as collateral for a loan or filed a lien on it.
37 See RESTATEMENT (THiD) OF UNFAIR COMPETmON § 39 (1993) ("A trade secret is any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.").
38 See id. at §§ 39-44. Neither the federal government nor states maintain a title registry for
trade secrets. The primary purpose of trade secret law is to provide augmented remedies for secrets
that are misappropriated through otherwise tortious conduct or through the breach of an express or
implied promise of confidentiality. See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1194-95; Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, Remedies for the
Misappropriation ofIntellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments Before and After
Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 849, 859-60 (1998); Paul J. Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of
Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 976-80 (1991).
39 See Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics ofRights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 690 (1979) (discussing difficulty of detecting whether secret has been
misappropriated).
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ability unilaterally to reduce its value by using it, revealing it to competitors of the
firm, or even publishing it.40 Contracts can be written to deter opportunistic behavior
by the transferor of a trade secret, but entering into protective agreements and policing
them raises the cost of the transaction, especially if the transferor is unwilling to agree
to draconian penalties for unauthorized post-transfer revelation.
The firm who acquires a trade secret as an asset should also have concerns about
possible revelation through entities related to the transferor who have knowledge of
the secret. These might include former employees of the transferor, its creditors, 4 1 or
firms that unsuccessfully negotiated with the transferor for acquisition of the same
information. Anyone with knowledge of the secret retains the power to affect its
value. Although the law will often imply a promise not to reveal the secret,42
identifying implied promises is onerous, as would be identifying and negotiating
promises from those who do not owe a duty of confidentiality.43 Erecting an
affirmative asset partition by contract is clearly difficult and fraught with uncertainty.
In fact, given that the law permits others to reverse engineer the secret or
40 Id at 709.
[I]nformation transactions are difficult ... [I]f the transaction involves information that can
be protected only through secrecy, it will be difficult for [the buyer] to know whether the
information is being provided to other firms. "Shhh!," the seller will wisely caution everyone.
If that contingency cannot be monitored, however, the buyer will not know what to pay for
the information.
Id.
41 Imagine a judgment lien creditor who properly levies on all the transferor's assets,
including documents containing the chemical formula. An argument can be made that the levying
creditor's commercial exploitation of the secret would be rightful. First, trade secret
misappropriation generally only occurs when the secret is obtained via trespass or breach of an
express or implied promise not to reveal it. See RESTATEMENT (TAIRD) OF UNFAR COMPETmON §
40 (1993). The creditor's possession of the transferor's assets after the levy is legal, and he will
have made no express promise to the licensee/transferee not to reveal the secret. One might argue
that the creditor makes an implied promise not to exploit the information until after it is sold at
auction, see U.C.C. § 9-504 (2001) (regulating form of post-repossession sale of collateral), or
formally accepted by the creditor in full satisfaction of the transferor's debts, cf U.C.C. § 9-505(b)
(2001) (setting forth option of secured party to keep repossessed collateral in satisfaction of debt),
but there is no case law on the issue. At a minimum, as subject to auction or retention by the
levying creditor, information protected only by trade secret law remains vulnerable in a way that a
patent does not. Any buyer of the secret should have substantial fears about the stability of the
secret information as an asset and the ability to partition it from interference.
42 See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo, 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 1953).
43 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1986), where
the secret is revealed to two potential licensees, Consarc and La Floridienne, who according to the
court owe no duty not to reveal it. A transferee would have to find and negotiate with such parties
to erect a complete partition.
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independently discover it,44 a completely effective partition would be staggeringly
costly to negotiate by contract.45
To feel secure when it acquires an automobile, the firm need only negotiate a
simple agreement with the seller and check the state title registry. As we have just
seen, partitioning an information asset through contract law and secrecy can be vastly
more complex and costly. If the chemical formula, however, is patented,
accomplishing a secure transfer of the asset is greatly simplified. If the transferor's
interest is recorded in the Patent Office, the transferee's subsequent recordation of its
acquisition under 3 5 U.S.C. § 26146 will cheaply partition it from later interference by
the transferor, its creditors, heirs, and related entities.47 Recording the patent interest,
of course, does not make the formula absolutely immune from interference, because
an infringement can still occur. No asset partition, however, is ever completely
effective. A firm's motor vehicle, for example, can be stolen or damaged by a third
party. The point is that thepatent title system greatly reduces the cost of identifying
the quality of the legal rights the transferor grants and establishes a liability regime
that does not require the transferee to enter into a costly array of protective
agreements. Furthermore, much like the Uniform Commercial Code, patent law
provides for statutory gap-filler terms that further reduce the costs of negotiation and
dispute resolution.48
It must be noted, however, that in order to obtain the benefits of the patent title
recordation system, the transfer of a patent must qualify as an "assignment" of the
44 See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETMON § 43 (1988) ("Independent discovery
and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means of acquisition.").
45 The finn would have to extract promises from all other firms with the capacity to reverse
engineer or independently discover the secret. Such a fictional negotiation would be further
complicated by the firm's desire not to reveal the secret in the course of obtaining a promise from a
competitor not to discover it.
46 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) "[A]n assignment, grant, or conveyance" that has been properly
recorded "[has] the attributes of personal property" and the recorded assignment has priority over
any subsequent transfers. Id.
47 Id. ("An assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the
Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of the
subsequent purchase or mortgage.").
48 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000) (goveming rights in inventions made with federal
assistance); §§ 251-56 (rules governing reissue of defective patents and correction of other
mistakes, including mistakenly named inventors); § 261 (providing priority rules between
competing claimants); § 271 (defining what constitutes wrongful use of the invention); §§ 282-84
(identifying defenses and providing remedies, including injunctive relief and treble damages);
§ 285 (attorney's fees available); § 287 (limitations on damages); § 295 (shifting burden of proof in
some process patent cases).
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invention.49 Since courts have interpreted assignment to include only "the exclusive
right to make, use, and vend the invention throughout the United States; or... an
undivided part or share of that exclusive right,' 50 a non-exclusive licensee cannot
effectively record its interest under section 261.51 This renders a non-exclusive
licensee more vulnerable to the creditors of a bankrupt licensor. For example, in
Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,52 the Fourth Circuit held that
the trustee of a bankrupt licensor had the right to terminate unilaterally any non-
exclusive intellectual property licenses entered into by the debtor/licensor. 53 Exercise
of the termination right can leave the non-exclusive patent licensee without access to
important technology. Using contract law to prevent such an eventuality would
require obtaining pre-bankruptcy subordination agreements from all of the licensor's
creditors-an incredibly costly, and maybe impossible, task. In the late 1980s,
Congress recognized the dilemma of non-exclusive licensees and enacted 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(n),54 which provides protection against the bankruptcy estate's right to
terminate executory intellectual property licenses. 55 For non-exclusive licensees,
4 9 See id. § 261 (setting forth the form that constitutes "prima facie evidence of the execution
of an assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent or application for patent").
50 Waterman v. McKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891); accordIn re Cybernetic Serv., Inc.,
252 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2001).
51 The Patent Office will permit the physical filing ofnon-exclusive licenses, but courts have
held that permissive filings do not establish priority rights as against third parties. See Cybernetic
Serv., 252 F.3d at 1057 (holding that filing of security interest in Patent Office did not perfect
creditor's rights in patent collateral).
52 Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Furnishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
53 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
54 Act of Oct. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 365 (2000)).
If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor of a right
to intellectual property, the licensee ... may elect-
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such
contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific
performance of such contract) under such contract... to such intellectual property ....
§§ 365(n)(1). See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2000) ("'[Intellectual property' means--(A) trade
secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent application; (D)
plant variety; [and] (E) work of authorship protected under title 17 .... ").
55 The extent to which section 365(n) helps a licensee of trade secrets is unclear. A licensee
almost surely retains the right to continue using the secret, but it may not retain the right to prevent
the trustee from licensing the secret to others. The legislation provides that the trustee must
recognize the continuing right of the licensee "to enforce any exclusivity provision of such a
contract." 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(l)(B). See also H.R. REP. No. 100-1012, at 6-7 (1988).
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patent law now works in tandem with bankruptcy law to protect transferees of
technology.
The patent registration system lowers the cost of partitioning certain kinds of
information assets. Whether the firm is buying or selling an invention, patent
recordation reduces the number of contracts and contract terms that must be
negotiated. The corporate form achieves the same result with a firm's tangible assets.
The cost savings in the context of both the corporate form and the patent form are
primarily related to asset transfer.
C. The Corporate Form and the Team Production Problem
Another body of corporate law scholarship suggests how patent law reduces costs
of developing and exploiting information assets. When the cost of contracting outside
the firm is high, and especially when the cost of preventing post-contractual
opportunistic behavior is also high, economists generally expect to see an increased
degree of vertical integration. 56 For example, if a transferee firm's cost of acquiring
technology and the risk of post-contractual misbehavior by the transferor is
sufficiently high, the firm may rationally decide to conduct its own research and
development or, perhaps, to acquire the transferor.57 In other words, vertical
integration is one way to reduce some of the costs associated with deterring
opportunism. Bringing transactions within the firm, however, does not make the
problem of opportunistic behavior disappear. Recent commentary explores how the
Under the legislation, any right in the license agreement giving the licensee an exclusive
license will still be enforceable by the licensee, but other rights of the licensee cannot be
specifically enforced...
The debtor/trustee will essentially have no obligation to the licensee after rejection other
than to turn over existing technology and permit the licensee to use the technology....
Id. Cf In re Quad Sys. Corp., 2001 WL 1843379 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2001). A trade secret license,
however, cannot provide true exclusivity for a licensee since it always remains vulnerable to
reverse engineering, independent invention, or discovery in public sources. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1993). The most a trade secret licensor can promise is to
not reveal the secret to others or otherwise use it in violation of the agreement.
56 Klein et al., supra note 19, at 298 ("[A]s assets become more specific and more
appropriable quasi rents are created (and therefore the possible gains from opportunistic behavior
increases), the costs of contracting will generally increase more than the costs of vertical
integration. Hence, ceterisparibus, we are more likely to observe vertical integration."); Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power. Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. 1619, 1630 (2001) ("[T]he core reason why transactions are
brought within the firm is to solve problems created by the prohibitively high cost of complete
contracting.").
57 See Klein et al., supra note 19, at 299 ("[Jloint ownership... economize[s] on contracting
costs necessary to insure nonopportunistic behavior.").
[Vol. 66:473
TRANSA CTION COSTS THEORY OF PA TENT LA W
corporate form minimizes the cost of opportunism within the firm and sheds light on
how patent law can serve the same function when development and exploitation of
information assets takes place within the firm structure as well as among multiple
parties.
Modem analysis of corporate governance rules has long focused on agency
problems. 58 Corporate shareholders have been characterized as the owners of a firm
run by a board of directors whose prime concern should be maximizing the firm's
value for the owners' benefit.59 For this reason, the virtual independence of the board
from shareholder control has been seen by many commentators as creating significant
principal-agent problems.60 Others, however, have suggested that the independence
of directors can be positively perceived, as a 'mediating hierarchy' ... [having] the
purpose and effect of insulating corporate directors from the direct command and
control of any of the groups that comprise the corporate team, including its
shareholders." 6' Corporate law scholars like Blair and Stout do not deny the existence
of agency costs, but argue that insulating the board from shareholder control is critical
to solving important team production problems.
They explain:
In the economic literature, team production problems are said to arise in
situations where a productive activity requires the combined investment and
coordinated efforts of two or more individuals or groups. If the team members'
investments are firm-specific (that is, difficult to recover once committed to the
project), and if output from the enterprise is nonseparable (meaning that it is difficult
to attribute any particular portion of the joint output to any particular member's
contribution), serious problems can arise in determining how any economic
surpluses generated by team production-any "rents"-should be divided.62
The team consists not only of shareholders who provide some of the capital for
the firm, but also others who make firm-specific investments, such as "[e]xecutives,
rank-and-file employees, and even creditors [and] the local community."'63 Since
production within the firm requires cooperation among multiple participants, the
58 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); ROBERTA ROMANO,
FOuNDATIONs OF CORPORATE LAw (1993). For additional sources, see Blair & Stout, supra note
21, at 248 n.1.
5 9 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIc STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw (1991).
60 See id.
61 Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 255.
6 2 
Id. at 249.
63 Id. at 250.
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threat of opportunism that drives vertical integration continues to pose problems after
integration is achieved.
According to Blair and Stout, two common sorts of problems arise. First, "If the
team members agree in advance to allocate any profits according to some fixed
sharing rule, obvious free-rider problems arise: Each team member will have an
incentive to shirk, since he will get the same share of the total whether or not he
works hard."64 Shirking can be addressed by a merit reward system, but:
[I]f the team members have no fixed sharing rule [and] simply agree to allocate
rewards after the fact, when the time comes to divvy up the surplus all have
incentives to indulge in wasteful rent-seeking, squandering time and effort haggling
and trying to grab a larger share of the total output. 65
Ideally, the members of the team would be able to deal with shirking and
opportunism by ex-ante contracting, but it is frequently too costly to ensure
cooperation and to deter opportunism by contract.66 Given the number of individuals
and groups that make firm-specific contributions, often of varying and
incommensurate sizes, it is easy to see how contract law alone is insufficient.
The corporate form provides a solution to team production problems by allowing
"rational individuals who hope to profit from team production to overcome shirking
and rent-seeking by opting into an internal governance structure... the 'mediating
hierarchy.' ' 67 In essence, the corporate form allows team members to give up a
degree of control over the enterprise to "an intemal hierarchy whose job is to
coordinate the activities of the team members, allocate the resulting production, and
mediate disputes among team members over that allocation." 68 It is the independence
of the board of directors sitting atop the hierarchy that enables it to monitor the
contributions of team members and appropriately allocate rents and risks. Instead of
being a problem for shareholders, the independence of the directors can, in theory,
increase the likelihood that the corporate team will function in a mutually beneficial
manner. For example, if shareholders directly controlled decisions to issue themselves
dividends, the willingness of lenders and employees of the corporation to make
6 4 Id. at 266.
6 5 Id.
66 But see Robert P. Merges, The Law andEconomics ofEmployee Inventions, 13 HARv. J. L.
& TECH. 1, 20-26 (1999) (deronstrating how default common law ownership rules ameliorate
some team production problems).
67 See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 250. For a discussion of the theory of the "second
best," see Kelvin Lancaster & Richard Lipsey, The General Theory of the SecondBest, in KELVIN
LANcASTER, TRADE, MARKETS, AND WELFARE 193 (1996). In theory, the best solution would be
explicit contracts covering all important contingencies and negotiated at a reasonable cost. In
complex enterprises, this is often not possible.
68See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 251.
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optimal firm-specific investments would be deterred. They would be genuinely
concerned by the prospect that shareholders would divert those investments to
themselves and away from the firm.
The team production explanation of the evolution of the corporate form is not
necessarily a normative prescription for firm governance. There is no guarantee that a
board will adequately monitor shirking, fairly allocate rents, or effectively mediate
disputes. The theory, however, may explain why the law treats directors more like
trustees than as agents, shielding them from shareholder control by limiting the
effectiveness of shareholder voting rights and protecting them in derivative litigation
through the business judgment rule.69 It also helps explain why comparatively fewer
complex enterprises are operated as partnerships. 70 Whether Blair and Stout's
explanation of how a mediating hierarchy reduces team production problems is
convincing in all its details, the importance of cooperation in team production is
undisputed. Analyzing patent law as the solution to specific types of team production
problems helps us understand its evolution and present form and points descriptive
analysis away from purely incentive-based justifications for patent law.
D. The Patent Form and Team Production Problems
The team production problem is particularly acute in the case of information
assets, and the patent form ameliorates them in a number of different ways. Within a
single firm, patent registration reduces the need to fence information off between
team members and enhances trust and cooperation. Additionally, in the context of
transfers of information assets between firms, especially in cases involving joint
production, several commentators have already noted cost savings in assembling a
functioning team.71 Most importantly, this section explores for the first time how the
patent form facilitates the creation of a cost-reducing mediating hierarchy in contexts
as diverse as academic research, patent pools, and debtor financing.
1. Fencing Costs, Patents, and Team Cooperation
Imagine our hypothetical firm contemplating the exploitation of a secret chemical
formula. The firm would like to use the formula in the production of a new car wax,
but it must decide whether to apply for a patent or keep the formula secret. Given the
number of team members usually involved in bringing a new product to market, the
choice of trade secrecy over patent protection will significantly raise the firm's cost of
innovation. In the absence of a patent, there will be no record owner of the chemical
69 Id. at 290-305.
70 Id. at 320-28.
71 See ASHISH ARORA & ROBERT P. MERGES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, FIRM BOUNDARIES, AND
R&D INPUTS 5 (2001) at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=255869.
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formula, and its intangible nature will make it vulnerable to misappropriation by team
members. A firm will rationally choose to reduce the possibility of misappropriation
by extracting promises of confidentiality, physically fencing the secret off from team
members, or both. The cost of taking contractual precautions is especially easy to see
in a case like Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries,72 where a firm
engaged in the manufacture of printing presses protected its secret part drawings
through hundreds of confidentiality agreements signed by employees and
subcontractors. 73 The time and effort necessary to administer, monitor, and enforce
confidentiality in the large team context is substantial, even where form
confidentiality agreements can be used to lower the cost of contracting. In addition,
non-compete agreements may need to be negotiated and enforced in order to prevent
the misappropriation threat that arises when an employee leaves the firm. 74
Apart from taking costly contractual measures, taking additional physical
precautions may involve hiring security personnel, installing alarm systems, or
erecting other barriers between workers and secret equipment or processes.75 Taking
precautions can lead to production inefficiencies and an erosion of trust among team
members. Members may become hesitant to exchange information within the team
because anyone exposed to a secret can behave opportunistically in the precise sense
used by Blair and Stout.76 By misappropriating the secret, a team member can engage
in unilateral and non-consensual ex post allocation of the rents. With tangible assets,
the corporate form addresses this problem by assigning ownership to the corporation
and the rent allocation task to an independent board of directors. The corporate form
by itself, however, cannot effectively prevent opportunistic misallocation of intangible
information assets protected merely by trade secret law. By choosing patent
protection, any enterprise-a partnership, sole proprietorship, or corporation-can
record its ownership of the asset, thereby deterring misappropriation while reducing
the need to erect costly fences. To paraphrase Klein et al., patent law allows firms to
"economiz[e] on contracting costs necessary to assure nonopportunistic behavior in
72 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).
73 Id. at 177 ("Rockwell employs 200 [engineers who are] required to sign agreements not to
disseminate the drawings .... [V]endors ... too are required to sign confidentiality agreements,
and in addition each drawing is stamped with a legend stating that it contains proprietary
material.").
7 4 See ROBERT P. MERGES ETAL., INTELLECUAL PROPERTYINTHE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
84-96 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the legally permissible scope of restrictions on employees who
leave the firm).
75 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986)
(noting trade secret owner's "security measures taken to conceal the furnaces from all but
authorized personnel. The furnaces were... hidden from public view, while signs warned all about
restricted access.").
76 See Blair & Stout, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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the presence of appropriable quasi rents."'77 By establishing clear title, the patent
recordation system reduces the firm's cost of keeping secrets and therefore helps
reduce the cost of deterring opportunistic rent seeking by team members while
simultaneously increasing trust and cooperation within the team.
2. Patents and Inter-Firm Team Building
Several important studies suggest that the patent form also enables relationships
between firms engaging in cooperative ventures of various sorts. The problem of
opportunism discussed above suggests that an essential information asset protected
only by trade secret law would be more difficult to bargain over than information
embodied in a patent. In fact, Gallini and Winter were willing to conclude that in
many circumstances, "[1]icensing occurs in such a market only ifpatent protection is
available to the licensor." 78 The patent form enables a potential transferor to share an
information asset without fear of misappropriation while assembling the complex
team necessary to commercialize a new product. Negotiating is also facilitated by the
fact that the "metes and bounds" of the patented invention are delineated with relative
clarity because of patent law's written description and enablement requirements. 79 In
other words, the scope of the information asset bargained over and shared is usually
clearer when embodied in the patent form. Gallini and Winter state: "[T]he role of
patents in our model is not the traditional role of creating monopolies by prohibiting
the exploitation of informational spillovers. Rather, by protecting property rights,
patents here open the market for trade in technological information."80
In the context of inter-firm team assembly, Arora et al. conclude that the patent
form is especially effective at reducing the cost of contracting when "know how"
must be transferred. 81 They note:
Transferring tacit 'know-how' is costly and difficult, often requiring individual
training. On the licensor's side, there is little to guarantee that the technology
recipient will pay after the transfer-after all, it cannot 'unlearn' and return what the
licensor has taught it. On the licensee's side, there is little to guarantee that the
licensor will send its best engineers or transfer all it knows. In light of this well-
known conundrum, drafting an enforceable contract is virtually impossible without
77 See Klein et al., supra note 19, at 307.
78 Gallini & Winter, supra note 16, at 238 (emphasis added).
79 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
80 Gallini & Winter, supra note 16, at 238. See also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697,732 (2001) ("For example,
complete transferability is important to ensure that commercialization is conducted by the lowest
cost provider.").
81 HAHN, supra note 5, at 29 (citing ASHISH ARORA ETAL., MARKETs FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY (2002)).
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some additional means to ensure compliance. That is where patents come in. The
licensor can revoke the use of a patent if the licensee fails to pay after receiving the
trade secret portion of the knowledge transfer. The licensee can refuse to pay
royalties if the licensor does not transfer adequate know-how. 82
The patent facilitates compliance measures and thereby enhances trust and
cooperation.
In their examination of the relationship between independent input suppliers-
smaller research-specific firms---and large firms with greater commercialization
capacity, Arora and Merges find that patents "reduce the risk of buyer firm
opportunism." 83 The patent enables the creation of a team consisting of a small
independent research firm or individual inventor and a larger firm that requires
specialized expertise. Arora and Merges find that when the cost of opportunism is
reduced, increased trust among the inter-firm team creates synergy and enables
specialization and positive information spillovers.84 The empirical data they collect
shows that robust patent protection plays a significant role in facilitating technology
sharing between the set of firms best situated to conduct research and the set of firms
best situated to engage in commercialization of information assets. 85
Finally, although invention within the academic context is discussed in more
detail below, it is worth noting here the effect the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 had on
patenting behavior in research institutions. 86 In 1980, Congress made it much easier
for universities to patent their research. Although studies measuring patent citation
suggest that the change did not stimulate more or better research, rates of academic
patenting and licensing exploded.87 In other words, the option of utilizing the patent
form enabled an increase in technology sharing. In their article, Henderson et al.
concluded that "the increase in university patenting probably reflects an increased rate
of technology transfer to the private sector, and this has probably increased the social
rate of return to university research. '88 Patenting and licensing have become critical
to universities because such institutions are usually ill-equipped to commercialize
inventions. They typically must partner with private firms.89 Cooperation is a two-
way street, however. Hahn notes that "a university inventor's continued participation
is apparently key to developing a commercially viable product from the initial
82 Id. at 30 (citing ARORA ET AL., supra note 81).
83 See Arora & Merges, supra note 71, at 1.
84 See id. at 3.
85 See id. at 14, 19-20.
86 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000).
87 See Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A
DetailedAnalysis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119 (1998).
88 Id. at 126.
89 See HAHN, supra note 5, at 25.
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embryonic invention." 90 The sudden availability of the patent form apparently
enabled the creation of the complex public-private teams necessary to exploit certain
inventive activity.9 1 Data from national laboratories after Congress authorized the use
of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) tell a similar
story.92
This connection between patenting and increased technology transfer previews
and underlines the normative thesis set forth more fully in Part Il: Even where the
availability of a patent does not stimulate more research, the reduction of transaction
costs associated with the patent form may be sufficient in and of itself to stimulate
technology transfer and exploitation, thereby providing a significant justification for
the patent system.
3. Patents, Monitoring Costs and the Creation of Mediating Hierarchs
The most striking way patents facilitate team production can be seen in how they
are used to create "mediating hierarchs." The term has not yet found its way into the
intellectual property literature, but it provides a theoretical construct to illustrate how
the patent registration system lowers transactions costs in settings as diverse as
individual firms, academic institutions, patent pools, and financial institutions.
In their general discussion of the firm, Alchian and Demsetz propose a hierarchy
where one team member has the responsibility of monitoring shirking problems and
in return receives any residual rents from the enterprise. 93 Such a monitor has
powerful incentives to coordinate efficient production among members of the team.
Alchian and Demsetz have, nonetheless, been criticized on the ground that their
model assumes away "any productive advantages from horizontal interactions among
specialized team members." 94 In particular, employees are left "with no stake in the
90 Id. See also Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The
Licensing of University Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240, 243 (2001) ("For 71 percent of the
inventions licensed, respondents claim that successful commercialization requires cooperation by
the inventor and the licensee in further development.").
91 See HAHN, supra note 5, at 25 ("Jensen and Thursby argue that... patents allow for
contracts that solve the moral hazard problem: the developer can receive exclusive rights while
royalty payments (or, less commonly, equity stakes) stipulated in the license provide incentives for
the inventor to provide continued support.").
92 See Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lemer, Reinventing Public R&D: Patent Policy and the
Commercialization of National Laboratory Technologies, 32 RAND J. ECON. 167 (2001)
(examining federal R&D initiatives at national laboratories and finding "a substantial impact on the
laboratories' patenting").
93 See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM ECON. REV. 777, 78i-82 (1972), cited in Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at
266 & n.36.
94 See Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 275.
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enterprise and no firm-specific investment."95 Blair and Stout, therefore, do not
accept that "the best solution is to allocate control rights.., to the party whose
specialized investment is most critical to the success of the enterprise"9 6
They prefer instead the suggestion of Rajan and Zingales that relinquishing
control to a disinterested monitor outside the production team is often more
efficient.97 They assert that a third party who makes no firm-specific investment, but
who is trusted by the team and who receives a nominal share of the rents produced by
the enterprise, may do a better job of maximizing team output. 98 If the outside
monitor is given authority to build and maintain a productive team, then team
members may "feel they can now safely invest."99 Blair and Stout argue that Rajan
and Zingales's defense of outside monitoring provides a powerful explanation for the
popularity of the corporate form. In a public corporation, an independent board of
directors can play the same role as an outside monitor, disinterestedly punishing
shirking, resolving disputes, and deciding how best to distribute or reinvest excess
earnings. 100
Patent law plays at least two cost-reducing roles in the monitoring context. First,
it can reduce the cost of monitoring, regardless of whether the monitor is independent
(Blair & Stout) or a team member (Alchian & Demsetz). Second, where the creation
of a mediating hierarch is desirable, patent law can facilitate independent monitoring
even when the corporate form is not available.
Private firms. In general, the choice to patent information assets makes the
monitoring task less costly. One important economic study finds that business
"executives identified [a motive] for patenting that [has] little connection with
appropriating returns from investment[:] ... to measure the performance of R&D
employees, which is a significant problem because these workers are typically
engaged in team production."'101 Patent counts can play a significant role in tracking
productivity and performance within the firm. For example, compensation can be
adjusted on the basis of patents successfully applied for. One of my students worked
as an intellectual property manager in a prominent multinational corporation, and he
reports a system of colored badges issued to identify researchers by the number of
95 Id.
96 Id. at 272-73 ("[I]f A's contribution to the research effort is more vital than B's, the best
we can do is to protect and encourage A's investment by making A the 'owner' of the enterprise.').
97 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Finn, 113Q. J. EcoN.
387,422-24 (1998).
9 8 Id, cited and discussed in Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 274 & n.57.
99 Blair & Stout, supra note 21, at 274 & n.57.
100 Id. at 275-76.
101 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIvrry 783, 798 (1987).
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patents obtained for the company.102 Other more tangible benefits also accrued when
certain patenting milestones were met.10 3 Significantly, badge color was based on the
number of patents awarded, not on the basis of the income they produced for the
employer. 10 4
In addition, patent law requires that the true inventor(s) be listed on the patent
application.' 0 5 The primary contributor to the invention is therefore established early
on, settling at least one possible source of team friction and providing a locus for
negotiations. 106 Monitoring team production is more difficult when innovation
involves a trade secret. Information is suppressed, even within the firm, when trade
secrets are at issue. And in the absence of a clear title system, establishing credit for a
secret contribution is more difficult, as is assigning blame if the information
mysteriously leaks to other firms.
Academic Institutions. Critically, the patent form can facilitate the creation of a
mediating hierarch even in the absence of incorporation. Consider the university
setting, which fosters a great deal of inventive activity in the United States.
Academics are typically institutional employees; their salaries are dependent on a
combination of teaching competence and publication record in academic journals.
Most institutions of higher education, however, have established special foundations
to facilitate the sharing of rents generated by research.10 7 At the University of
Georgia, in return for the promise to assign patents to the University, researchers are
given a percentage of royalties earned from licenses administered by the University of
Georgia Research Foundation. 10 8 University foundations operate relatively
independently, like boards of directors in public corporations, so concerns about
shirking and rent allocation among team members-inventive professors, their
colleagues, public and private grantors, and the university administration-may be
reduced.
102 Interview with Russell F.R. Denton, Attorney, King & Spalding in Athens, Ga. (Feb. 10,
2004).103 Id.
104Id.
105 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000) (priority rules for competing inventors); § 111
(application); § 116 (joint inventorship).
106 See Levin et al., supra note 101, at 798 & n.29 (noting that in some industries,
participation requires access to multiple patents often held by multiple firms and "a prudent new
entrant will establish a patent portfolio of its own, thus compelling established firms to negotiate
cross-license agreements").
10 7 See, e.g., http://www.stanford.edu/dept/ORA/ (representing Stanford University's state of
the art research administration center) (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
108 Interview with Rebecca Downey, University of Georgia Research Foundation in Athens,
Ga. (June 15, 2002). See http://www.ovpr.uga.edu/ugarf (representing the University of Georgia's
Research Foundation, Inc.) (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
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When an independent foundation or other outside body is charged with
monitoring shirking and allocating rents, all team members should feel more free to
invest. Creating an effective mediating hierarch in the absence of a patent, however, is
less practicable. The inventor/academic could theoretically assign his interest in a
trade secret to the university, but this would create uncertainties not present in the
patent context. Because one cannot register title to a secret, the assignment of a trade
secret would consist of nothing more than the researcher's promise to reveal
information to the university, combined with a promise not to reveal it to anyone else.
The monitor's role after revelation is ambiguous. Is the information really secret or do
others skilled in the art already know it? And how much is it worth? Arrow's
information paradox suggests that licensing the secret and realizing its value will be
difficult.' 09 A patented invention, although subject to challenge, has at least been
approved by the patent office as new, useful, and a nonobvious advance over the prior
art.I10 More importantly, perhaps, the patent office will decide who owns a patent as
between two competing claimants. Although the quality of patent office scrutiny has
been criticized, to an independent monitor with no special expertise in any one field, a
patent provides valuable information. No such outside imprimatur is available for
trade secrets.
The patent registration system therefore provides a form around which a complex
team can be effectively organized outside the context of incorporation. If the
professor/researcher is willing to assign all rights in the patent to an expert non-team
member, such as a university foundation, then something like the disinterested outside
monitor preferred by Blair and Stout, and Rajan and Zingales, is created:
109 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241,280 (1998) (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE
AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR INVENTION, in THE RATE AND DiRECrON OF INVENTIVE
AcnvrVy 614-16 (1962)).
[T]here is a significant obstacle-known as "Arrow's Information Paradox"--to bargaining
over secret information. A trade secret owner generally is reluctant to reveal the secret unless
the potential licensee first promises not to use it in the event a license is not negotiated. The
licensee, on the other hand, is not likely to make such a promise without first learning the
secret.
Id.
1 10 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2000).
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This essay need not decide whether inside or outside monitoring is generally
preferable to attain entrepreneurial objectives. What is important is that the patent
form facilitates the choice between monitoring forms, even in the absence of a
corporate structure, and reduces monitoring costs, regardless of the form chosen.
Patent Pools. Merges has already pointed out how patent pools reduce
transaction costs between members when access to multiple technologies owned by
multiple parties is necessary for innovation and commercialization."'I Transacting
over valuable technology can be costly when multiple parties each have control of
essential components. One way to facilitate follow-on improvement and
commercialization is an agreement by all rights holders to grant cross-licenses to their
competitors. In theory and practice, patent pools can "combine far-flung property
rights into useable bundles, overcoming the tragedy of the anticommons while
preserving the incentives that come with these rights."'' 12
Deciding how much to compensate each licensor, however, is a potential
stumbling block to the creation of a technology pool. Without an effective monitor,
squabbling over the relative value of inputs and other compensation issues can doom
a collective rights enterprise. Neither the Demsetz-Alchian solution of appointing a
single team member, nor the Stout-Blair solution of incorporation, is typically
feasible. Nonetheless, patent pools have found a way to utilize the concept of the
Ill See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of
Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARiES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOvATION POUCY
FOR THE KNOWLEDGE Soc-arY 123, 129 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
A patent pool is an arrangement among multiple patent holders to aggregate their patents. A
typical pool makes all pooled patents available to each member ofthe pool. Pools also usually
offer standard licensing terms to licensees who are not members of the pool. In addition, the
typical patent pool allocates a portion of the licensing fees to each member according to a pre-
set formula or procedure.
Id.
112 Id.
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mediating hierarch. A passage from the 1935 Congressional Patent Pool Hearings on
aviation technologies discussed by Merges demonstrates one approach:
"[I]n the airplane cross-licensing agreement, after completely abolishing the
monopoly of the individual inventor and opening every patent to every member of
the association, it provides that a board of arbitrators may decide in any case what
reward should be paid to the individual patent owners and this is based not upon the
official determination of patentability by the Patent Office, but upon the unofficial
determination of the importance of the invention by a board of arbitrators." 1 13
More, recently, the MPEG-2 pool of nine patentees holding the 27 patents
essential to the exploitation of standard MPEG video technology adopted a slightly
different structure that included "expert administrative valuation procedures for...
determining royalty splits among members and.., a negotiation framework for
determining whether new technologies merit addition to the pool; and a pre-agreed
procedure for settling disputes."'' 14
In essence, the pool administration, however constituted, functions as a monitor,
trusted by its members to maximize cooperation between team members, the various
licensors in the pool, in order to generate the most returns for the group enterprise. "15
In this context, patents lower monitoring costs in two ways. First, the registration
system minimizes opportunism among members. Inventors can patent first and then
approach the pool without fear that information will be misappropriated. It is difficult
to imagine how an efficient trade secret pool could even function. Reducing
opportunism, however, is just half of the battle; the valuation/compensation problem
remains. Here again, the patent registration system makes the job of monitoring
easier. The clear delineation of rights within patent claims makes it easier for the
monitor to identify inputs and their relative contributions to the technology. Not only
is it clearer who contributed which pieces to the puzzle, the size and shape of each
piece is carefully set forth in the claims accepted by and registered in the patent office.
Imagine a monitor attempting to value the relative contribution of a dozen trade
secrets to a complex technology. With no document fixing the scope of what each
contributor "owned," the task would quickly become unwieldy. 116
113 Id. at 136 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pooling ofPatents: Hearings on H. R 4523 Before
the House Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong. 1140, 1144-45 (1935)).
114 Id. at 148.
115 This is precisely why, however, patent pools are the subject of significant antitrust
scrutiny. Michael Bednarek, Patent Pools as an Alternative to Patent Wars in Emergent Sectors,
16 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. NO. 7, at 1, 3 (2004) ("Patent pools have long been the subject of scrutiny
by antitrust regulators.").
116 Especially since more than one party can own a trade secret. Trade secret law does not
require absolute secrecy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 39 (1995)
(requiring only that the secret be not "generally known or readily ascertainable").
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Secured Financing. The patent form has advantages over trade secrecy in
reducing one other potentially important monitoring cost. When the innovative team
includes a creditor who is providing the capital necessary for team production, the
patent recordation system makes it significantly less costly for the creditor to monitor
the status of the information assets securing its investment. For example, if the firm's
most valuable asset is a chemical formula, it may be necessary to offer it as security
for a loan. Although it is possible to grant a security interest in a trade secret, 117 it is
unattractive collateral. If the secret leaks out, either through revelation, reverse
engineering, or independent invention, its value as collateral is destroyed. Even if the
secret can be kept, patent law provides several distinct advantages that lower a
lender's monitoring costs.
A significant cost of secured lending is monitoring the assets of the debtor to
ensure that they are not wasted or substituted in such a way such that the debtor is less
likely to satisfy its obligations. 118 If the debtor's main asset is a fleet of motor
vehicles, for example, a secured lender can relatively easily keep track of where they
are stored, how they are serviced and used, and when they are replaced. Best of all, a
secured creditor can take possession of vehicle certificates of title, making it very
difficult for the debtor to make an unauthorized disposition of the collateral. It is easy
to see why monitoring collateral like a chemical formula protected only by trade
secrecy is so difficult. If the debtor's most important asset is a secret, then the lender
must assure itself that the debtor is taking adequate physical and contractual
precautions to keep it hidden and is not engaged in unauthorized licensing of the
secret formula. Monitoring the status of a trade secret is clearly much more difficult
than monitoring the status of a patented invention, or a motor vehicle. Once the
chemical formula is patented, the lender need not monitor the quality of the debtor's
fencing efforts; it need only take an assignment of the patent and properly record it in
the Patent Office.
Even a patented formula, however, can be infringed, and discovering and
deterring illegal uses of the asset by competitors of the debtor is the most significant
monitoring cost in the context of intellectual property collateral. Once again,
monitoring is easier to do if the formula is patented. If the debtor uses the formula in a
car wax and is suddenly faced with a competitor selling the same product, patent law
provides for immediate injunctive relief.119 If the formula is only protected by trade
secret law, however, the competitor's use of the formula could well be legal, and
further fact-finding will be necessary to reveal whether the competitor
117 See U.C.C. § 9-102 (2003) (defining "general intangibles"). Cf Matter of Roman
Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207,212 (6th Cir. 1986) (involving secret formulas and customer lists taken
as collateral). An exhaustive search by the author revealed no cases discussing the status of trade
secrets as collateral.
118 See RANDAL PIcKER ET AL., SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 32-37 (2002).
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
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misappropriated the formula or whether it reverse engineered or independently
discovered it. In response, patent law provides a lender with an easy method to protect
its interests when it does not trust a debtor to pursue legal action to preserve the value
of the formula by suing infringers. Long ago, the Supreme Court in Waterman v.
McKenzie sanctioned a form of secured lending whereby the lender takes a complete
assignment of the patent rights, records its interest under section 261, and then grants
back an exclusive license to the debtor/inventor.120 This procedure gives standing to
the lender to enforce the patent in its own name and collect damages. 121
Most importantly, this same procedure can be used to put a specialized lender in
the role of mediating hierarch-a neutral arbiter of team production interested in
maximizing the value of the patent it now controls. Although he does not use the term
"team production" in his classic article on secured financing, Scott is aware of how a
secured lender/hierarch can solve monitoring problems in the team production
context. He notes that secured lending can address "the underinvestment
phenomenon.., the general principle that an agent [(the debtor)] will systematically
fail to exercise the effort necessary to maximize the joint product where part of the
returns must be repaid to the principal [(the lender)] in the form of a fixed royalty or
commission."' 122 The monitoring problem he identifies can be solved by "[t]he
leverage obtained by holding the debtor's assets hostage [which] empowers the secure
creditor to influence the debtor's business decisions, thus ensuring that new projects
are properly developed."12 3 The practice blessed in McKenzie, where the lender holds
registered title while the debtor takes back an exclusive license, gives the lender, now
serving as mediating hierarch, the sort of control over monitoring that Scott describes.
It must be emphasized that savings in monitoring costs are not trivial; the primary
normative economic defense of secured lending is based on such savings. 124 A great
120 Waterman v. McKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
121 Id.
122 Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 901, 921
(1986).
123 Id. at 904.
124 See Gus Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Credit, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 35, 43 (2000) ("Moreover, the granting of asset-based security interests to some creditors
shapes the monitoring incentives of those parties and the remaining unsecured creditors, and it
thereby coordinates monitoring activity."). Id. at 43 n.29 ("The monitoring explanation for secured
debt is prominent in the law and economics literature." (citing Thomas Jackson & Anthony
Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L. J. 1143 (1979); Alan
Schwartz, Security Interests andBankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL
STuD. 1 (1981); Saul Levnore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings,
92 YALE L. J. 49 (1982))). See also Barry Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy
Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STuD. 73 (1993); Richard Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for
Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 13 (1993).
Not all commentators are convinced that rules of secured lending are justified by lowered
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deal more empirical work needs to be done on the role patent rights play in reducing
the cost of secured lending, but monitoring-costs savings in this context may have
significant power in explaining some patenting behavior.
I1. PATENT PARADOXES AND THE CASE OF THE DISAPPEARING PATENTS
The transaction costs theory of patent law fits better with the existing empirical
data than does a pure incentive theory. Unlike theories that emphasize the incentive
effect of rewards for invention or innovation, a focus on transaction costs savings is
not inconsistent with empirical studies demonstrating: (i) the poor correlation between
R&D and patenting shown in recent studies on the impact of the Federal Circuit on
the behavior of inventive firms, the "Patent Paradox;"'125 and (ii) the prevalence of
patenting despite low levels of licensing, use, and highly uncertain prospects for
super-competitive profits, "The Case of the Disappearing Patents. '126
The creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals prompted a spate of
interesting studies measuring patenting behavior that have defied explanation by
simple incentive theories. In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit and gave it
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases of patent infiingement. The patent validity
rate began climbing immediately, almost doubling between 1982 and 1988.127 A pure
incentive theory of patent law would predict that an increase in the validity rate would
stimulate increased spending in research and development. 128 Greater protection for
inventions should have meant greater investment in creating them, but precisely the
opposite happened. A study by Bessen and Maskin found that "[t]he late 80's display
a leveling off and possibly a reversal of an upward trend in research intensity over the
previous decade. There does not appear to be so much as a 10% increase in R&D
monitoring costs. See Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle ofSecuredDebt, 37 VAND. L. REv.
1051 (1984).
125 See Bronwyn Hall & Rosemarie Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited- An Empirical
Study of Patenting in the US. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 101
(2001).
126 See JOHN ALLISON ET AL., VALUABLE PATENTS 1 (Geo. Mason U. School of Law,
Working Paper No. 03-31, 2003) ("Ninety-nine percent of patent owners never even bother to file
suit to enforce their rights. They spend $4.33 billion per year to obtain patents, but no one seems to
know exactly what happens to most of them. Call it 'The Case of the Disappearing Patents."). See
also Barnaby Felder, Patent Donations are Novel Corporate Gir, NY TIMEs, Nov. 17,2002, at 5
(noting that in some companies, less than ten percent of patented inventions are used or licensed).
127 See Donald Dunner et al.,A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions:
1982-1994, 5 FED. CjR. BAR J. 151, 154-56 (1995) (presenting statistics of the patent validity
rate-the rate at which patents are declared valid in litigation).
128 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 125, at 105 ("[T]he patent system aims to encourage
inventors to direct more of their resources toward R&D than would otherwise be the case.").
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intensity among firms and industries obtaining software patents."'129 Hall and
Ziedonis reported that "survey evidence suggests that firms in most industries have
not increased their reliance on patents for appropriating returns to R&D over the
decade of the 1980s. Yet, this period coincides with an unprecedented surge in
patenting in the United States. . . ."130 The increased validity rate stimulated more
patenting, but not more investment in research.' 31 As already noted, a boom in
patenting in the early 1980s stimulated by the Bayh-Dole Act did not correlate with
increased research, as measured by patent counts. 132
In addition, economic studies suggesting that increasing patent protection does
not necessarily provide added incentives for invention are consistent with doubts
previously articulated by economists concerning the nature of the value of exclusive
patent rights. 133 The traditional theory that granting exclusive rights provides
significant incentives sits very uneasily with mounting evidence that "most issued
patents are worthless, or very nearly worthless [without] market value, much less
market power."' 34 Few patents allow their owners to charge super-competitive prices
12 9 JANES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND IMITATION 18
(MIT Econ. Dept., Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000).
130 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 125, at 102 (citing WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING
THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASsETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING
FIRMs PATENT (OR NOT) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7552 2000); S.
Kortum & J. Lemer, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is Behind the Recent
Surge in Patenting?, 48 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 247
(1998)).
131 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 125, at 106 ("[E]mpirical studies have failed to find
evidence that the strengthening of U.S. patent rights during the 1980s stimulated industrial
spending in R&D." (citing Kortum & Lerner, supra note 130, BESSEN & MASKIN, supra note
129)). See also Henderson et al., supra note 87.
132 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. The rate of patenting is measured by the
number of applications filed in the patent office. One way to measure indirectly the strength of
research being done by an institution is to count how many times its patents are cited as prior art in
the applications of other inventors. Evidence post-Bayh-Doyle showed that universities patented at
a higher rate, but that their inventions were not cited in the literature with concomitantly greater
frequency; e.g., patent counts did not correlate with patenting rate.
13 3 See VERNON W. RUTTAN, TECHNOLOGY GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 543-45 (2001)
("Many economists have remained skeptical of the role of patents as a stimulus to invention.");
Turner, supra note 2, at 188 ("Scherer's survey of ninety-one large corporations demonstrates that
patent protection is the least influential factor in R&D decisions." (citing F.M SCHERER ET AL.,
PATENTS AND THE CORPORATION: A REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY UNDER CHANGING
PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1959))).
134 Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks, 13 HARV. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y. 119, 122-23 (1990) ("The claims of most issued patents are so narrow that
competitors can devise many ways of achieving the same thing as the subject matter of the
claim."). Accord Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (2000); see Merges et al., supra note 74, at
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or appropriate the full value of their innovation. 135 Survey evidence puts it more
bluntly, "R&D managers in semiconductors consistently reported that patents were
among the least effective mechanisms for appropriating returns to R&D
investments."'1 36 Such reports are consistent with the opinion expressed by some
economists that invention and innovation would continue in the absence of patent law
due to the natural economic advantages afforded to the finn that first conceives of and
exploits an idea. 137
1111 ("Patents grant the right to exclude in a tightly defined technological domain. In most cases,
this does not translate into what an economist would call a "'monopoly."'); see also Simone A.
Rose, "Monopolyphobia ": A Means of Extinguishing the Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 509, 510 (1999) ("[P]atents as property rights... seldom confer power over price .... ");
Federal Trade Commission and Anti-Trust Division Intellectual Property Guidelines § 2.2 (1995)
("Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive
levels for a significant period of time. The Agencies will not presume that patent, copyright, or
trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner."); Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d
898, 914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978) (concluding that a patent "rarely enjoys a dominant share in the
relevant market .... [because] 'the patent is limited to a unique form or improvement of the
product and the economic power resulting from the patent privileges is slight."' (quoting Northern
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958))).
135 See Paul Geroski, Markets for Technology: Knowledge, Innovation andAppropriability,
in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 90, 103 (Paul
Stoneman ed. 1995) ("most patents have very low value" (citing Mark Shankerman & Ariel Pakes,
Estimates of the Value ofPatent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96
ECON. J. 1052 (1986))); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,603 (1999) ("(Mlost [patented] technologies will not be economically
viable or commercially successful."). Cf F.M. SCHERER, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 58 (1999) ("[S]urveys show, most well-established
business enterprises consider patents a relatively unimportant means of protecting their innovations
from competitive imitation." (citing Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical
Study, 32 MGMT. Sci. 173 (1986))).
136 Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 125, at 102 (citing Cohen et al., supra note 130; Levin, et al.,
supra note 101).
137 See SCHERER, supra note 135, at 58-59.
Much more important [than patents] in the typical industry are the reputational and
learning-curve advantages of being first into the marketplace with a successful new product or
process, the possibility of keeping details of the technology secret from competitors, the
customer loyalty that comes from providing superior sales and service, and the threat of
creative destruction that forces companies to continue innovating or risk being left behind.
Id. See also id. at 81-88 (listing additional incentives to innovate provided by government
subsidies and tax policy). "Studies of the aircraft and semiconductor industries have shown that
gaining lead time and exploiting learning curve advantages are the primary methods of
appropriating returns." Levin et al., supra note 101, at 784, 794 (conceding that authors' own study
shows that "patents were generally rated the least effective of the mechanisms of appropriation").
See also, Mansfield, supra note 135; Cohen et al., supra note 130; JOSH LERNER, 150 YEARS OF
PATENT PROTECTION (Harvard Bus. School, Working Paper No. 00-039, 2002).
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These studies are also consistent with the doubts of Allison et al., who note that
less than one percent of patents are litigated and maybe three to four percent are ever
licensed. 138 They wonder whether "patent owners are simply irrational--that they are
leaving gobs of money on the table" and "a giant swath of patents unaccounted
for." 139 They call the phenomenon of patenting in the absence of exploitation, "The
Case of the Disappearing Patents."' 140 For economists, the question of why firms
patent is very much alive. The litigation and licensing data does not support the
simple explanation that firms patent primarily to recoup their investment in research
and development, which would, indirectly at least, support the theory that firms invent
in order to earn valuable patent rights.
Another reason why patent law may not stimulate R&D as directly as assumed by
conventional incentive theories may be related to the difficulty in predicting ex ante
the value of the exclusivity that patents confer. Denton and Heald have explored at
length the process of estimating the marginal additional value of a patent to an
inventor. 141 Patent valuation depends on fixing the value of the future income stream
generated by the patent right, as opposed to the value of the invention. The problems
in predicting the behavior of markets over time make most valuation, even after a
patented product is marketed, little more than a "guesstimate." 142 Even for those who
consciously sit down and try to do the math, 143 the uncertainty inherent in calculating
138 See ALLISON ET AL., supra note 126, at 3, n. 14.
139 Id. at 2, 3 n.14.
140/Id. at 1.
141 See Russell F.R. Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and
the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 1175 (2003) (setting forth a
novel variation of the Black-Scholes equation as a solution to the problem of valuing patent
licenses).
142 See Robert S. Bransom, Valuing Patents, Technologies andPortfolios: Rules of Thumb,
in HANDLING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 465, 471 (PLI Intell.
Prop., Handbook Series No. 635,2001). See also Brunswick Corp. v. United. States., 36 Fed. Cl.
204, 209 (1996) (calling known forms of patent valuation "inherently unreliable").
143 Blair and Cotter describe the basic economic model. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas
Cotter, An Economic Analysis ofDamages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1585 (1998); RogerD. Blair & Thomas Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX.INTELL
PROP. L. J. 1, 45-47 (2001). It assumes the ability to calculate the net present value (NPV) of the
total research effort, which is "equal to the discounted present value of the flow of future profits
minus the cost of creating the idea that generates the future flow of profits." Id. at 47. They
conclude that "the managerial investment criterion is straightforward: if the NPV is positive, the
investment should be undertaken because the discounted present value of the future profit flow
exceeds the cost of creating the idea." Id. In mathematical terms:
T
NPV = XH-, /(1 + r) -C
t=1
where C represents the total cost of invention, T equals the economic life of the idea, r is the
discount rate, / denotes the profit during period t, and I is the summation numerator. Id. at 46-47.
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the value of the excluding right before commercialization occurs renders it nearly
impossible for an R&D manager to be precisely influenced by the prospect of
protection. 144 This may be why surveys of R&D managers suggest that patenting
plays only a small role in their decisions on where to invest resources. 145
To summarize, trends in patenting do not necessarily correlate well with trends in
research and development expenditures. Although this observation is consistent with
other studies suggesting that patents seldom confer market power, economists are left
with a puzzle. Why do firms patent? Clarisa Long offers a pure non-incentive theory
to explain the patent paradox. She argues that patenting reduces private information
costs to firms. 146 The patent system allows firms to "choose to obtain and use a
portfolio of patent rights to signal information about themselves that would be more
expensive to [convey] through other means."' 147 Even if a particular invention is
unlikely to be either exploited within the firm or licensed, it may nonetheless be in the
interest of the firm to obtain a patent to signal the strength of its research capabilities
See also Schankerman & Pakes, supra note 135, at 1066. Although the possibility ofpatenting the
invention and excluding others should play a role in the calculation of the future income stream, it
is likely that most managers ignore it because no available metric provides an accurate tool for
making the calculation. See Denton & Heald, supra note 141, at 1176 (criticizing existing patent
metrics and proposing new tool adapted from the Black-Scholes equation for valuing stock
options); SCHERER, supra note 135, at 61-63 (discussing the variability in returns from R&D).
144 That is not to say innovators are never influenced by the real possibility that the power to
exclude will increase profits. Research decisions of pharmaceutical companies are almost certainly
influenced by the promise of patent rights. An incentive effect may be most likely in industries, like
the pharmaceutical industry, where the cost of innovation is enormous, a few firms dominate, track
records of prior innovations are well-established, firms have huge portfolios of inventions to spread
risks, and monopoly rewards can be substantial. See SCHERER, supra note 135, at 70 (discussing
special features of pharmaceutical industry); John H. Barton, Adapting the Intellectual Property
System to New Technologies, in GLOBAL DIMENSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 256 (Wallerstein et al. eds. 1993) (noting pharmaceuticals constitute an
exception to the normal lack of strong value); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Seigleman, Toward
an Integrated Theory oflntellectualProperty, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1460-61 (2002) (arguing that
pharmaceutical patents combine with strong trademarks to create market power and allow fuler
appropriation of R&D expenditures); Alexander Tabarrok, Patent Theory versus Patent Law, 1
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANAL. & POL'Y 1, 18-19 (2002) at
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss l/art9 (calling chemical and pharmaceutical
industries patent "outliers," noting Mansfield, supra note 135, found that patent protection played a
necessary role in a third or more of chemical and pharmaceutical innovations, higher than all other
industries studied).
145 See Levin et al., supra note 101; Mansfield, supra note 135.
146 See Long, supra note 13, at 628 ("[P]atents can reduce information asymmetries in capital
markets, thereby potentially reducing information costs."); id. at 679 ("[A]ttempts to place a value
on intellectual property should consider the role patents can play in mitigating informational
problems in capital markets.").
147 See id at 627-28.
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and the value of its human capital, and to advertise its likely future market niche. 148
Strategic disclosure may facilitate the acquisition of venture capital or even create
efficiencies in the licensing market by reducing information costs to potential business
partners. Long's theory does not depend on the notion that patent law creates
incentives to invent or innovate. It relies primarily on the role of patents in reducing
information costs and complements the transaction costs theory presented in this
paper in addressing patent paradoxes.
A firm may also patent out of fear that another firm will obtain control of
technological inputs necessary to its production. Although the patent novelty rules
should allay most of these fears, 149 so-called defensive patenting may explain some
behavior by risk-averse patentees. Lemley notes that "many patentees engage in
'defensive patenting,' obtaining patents to stake their claim to an area of technology
in hopes of preventing other companies from suing them. Indeed, there is anecdotal
evidence that at least among high-technology and start-up companies, the primary
purpose of patents is defensive." 150 The phenomenon of defensive patenting would
148 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 125, at 104 ("Our interviews suggestthatstrongerpatent
rights are especially critical to these firms in attracting venture capital funds ....); John L. Turner,
IV, The Patent Renaissance (2004) (paper on file with author) ("The non-legal value [of patents]
can take many forms, such as an improved ability to attract partners and capital due to signaling of
product quality, inventive productivity and/or commitment to entering a particular country's
markets.").
149 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) & (g) (2000). Only the first inventor qualifies for a patent. In
addition, since a "commercial use" of an invention constitutes a "public use," the first commercial
user, as opposed to the first inventor, also can object on lack of novelty grounds to the patent
application of a competing inventor or user. See also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); Electric Storage Battery
Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5,20 (1939) (holding that the ordinary use ofa machine forcommercial
purposes is prior public use).
150 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1889, 1949 n.249 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Standard-setting] (quoting Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1504-05 (2001)
[hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance]). See also OVE GRANDSTRAND, THE ECONOMICS AND
MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TOwARDs INTELLECTUAL CAPrrAUSM 214 (1999)
("[A] motive behind patenting [is to] block the competitors from blocking oneself, and thereby
ensure 'design freedom."); Keith M. Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: The Inventor's Lottery
Ticket, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 213, 228 n.56 (1993) ("Inventors often file patent applications only to
prevent a subsequent inventor from obtaining a patent on the invention and shutting down their
operations. This is commonly known as 'defensive patenting.'"); Lemley, Standard-setting, supra,
at 1949 ("[P]atents are used defensively rather than offensively; their primary economic value is as
a sort of trading card that reduces the risk that their owner will be held up by other patent
owners."); Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of
Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 604 (2002) ("Empirical
information on uses of patents outside of litigation is lacking, but studies suggest that the number
of patents that are licensed for royalties is not large, and that much of the perceived value from
patents lies in defensive patenting." (citing Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra, at 1503-06)); John
H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 Sci. 1933 (2000) (proposing reform to "solve the
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seem to be a negative externality in a case where the patentee has no plans to transfer
its technology, no desire to signal markets, and no hope of obtaining market power. In
such a case, the patent system may sometimes impose a cost that is consistent with the
empirical data discussed above, although not necessarily a significant cost. If this cost
were large enough, it would diminish the force of the transaction costs justification for
patent law. Clearly, more documentation of the defensive patenting phenomenon is
desirable, as would be legal reform to reduce it prevalence. 151
Conclusion. As a descriptive matter, incentive theories do a poor job of
explaining important aspects of patentee behavior. An emphasis instead on the
relationship between patenting and transaction costs provides a better explanation for
the flourishing of the patent form. Because patents effectively partition information
assets, signal important information to markets, and reduce the cost of monitoring
team production, the patent form will be used regardless of its ability to guarantee the
appropriation of expenditures on research and development. Dreams of market power
play no essential role. The transaction costs theory best illuminates Hall and
Ziedonis's findings that "the strengthening of U.S patent rights has indeed altered the
incentives of firms to patent, but for reasons that transcend those implied by a narrow
conception of patents as a mechanism by which to appropriate returns to R&D."'' 52
The story of patent law and patenting behavior is complex and multi-faceted; it
must be admitted, to the extent that the patent system makes some information assets
more valuable, we might expect some increase in R&D expenditures to create them,
but probably not at a first order of magnitude. Otherwise, we would see a much
tighter correlation between patenting behavior and expenditures to produce patentable
assets. It is most plausible to imagine a complex story: A regime of trade secrecy
entails significant transaction costs and is inadequate to render information assets as
valuable and usable as tangible assets. The patent title recordation system solves these
problems and facilitates the revelation of information about patentees. Like any other
property rule that secures exclusive rights, some rent-seeking will be generated, and
on some occasions, market power conferred.
Viewing patent law in this light, we need not be disturbed when we see periods
where the rate of patenting correlates poorly with the rate of research and
development expenditures. It is plausible that patenting increased after 1982 because
problem of defensive patent portfolios"); Scott Herhold, Patent War Pending: Once-Arcane Field
Emerges as Battleground Between Online Start-ups and Established Companies, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 18, 1999, at 1E (quoting a venture capitalist as saying "None of my
companies seek patent protection because they actually think it will protect them from
competition .... Rather, they seek patents to protect themselves from other people who have
patents.").
151 Several commentators have advocated a strong prior user's right, as is available in Europe,
that would prevent newly issued patents from interfering with ongoing uses of the patented
technology. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 74, at 171-72.
152 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 125, at 118.
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the patent system became more reliable, and therefore more likely to confer the
benefits and cost reductions identified above. Hall and Ziedonis report that firms
"harvest[ed]" more of their latent inventions in the 1980's and "ramp[ed] up" their
patent filings. 153 One of their interviewees even noted that there were 'a lot of
patentable inventions sitting around.""'154 Any title system that becomes twice as
reliable and predictable should see a heavy increase in usage. This does not
necessarily require, however, a concomitant increase in the production of the
underlying object, inventions, protected by the title system, although it might happen
under certain circumstances. 55
IV. A NORMATIVE CONCLUSION
The traditional normative defense of patent law asserts that the public benefits of
increased inventiveness, innovation, and disclosure of information offset the
monopoly costs imposed by holders of exclusive rights. 156 The economic data
discussed above has caused the most influential commentators in the field to question
both the power of patent law incentives, on the one hand, and the size of the
monopoly losses that the public suffers, on the other. The traditional normative
justification needs a complementary theory.
In a 1976 article, Kitch argued that the patent system might be partially justified
on grounds apart from the incentive-to-invent story. 157 First, analogizing the patent
registration system to the federal mineral claim system, he asserted that the public
notice, "the claim," provided by the early grant of a patent158 reduces the cost of
wasteful investments in duplicative research and development among competing
firms. 159 Second, he suggested that the patent recordation system reduces the cost to
innovators of identifyuing and obtaining necessary complementary technology.160
Third, he noted that by eliminating the need for secrecy, "a patent system reduces the
153 Id. at 122.
154 Id. at 109.
155 Again, pharmaceuticals are probably the major special circumstance. See supra note 142.
156 See supra notes 1-3.
157 See Kitch, supra note 17, at 276.
158 A working prototype of an invention need not exist in order for a patent to issue. See 35
U.S.C. §§ 102(g) & 112 (2000).
159 See Kitch, supra note 17, at 276 (noting that recordation "puts the patent owner in a
position to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent's value
so that duplicative investments are not made and so that information is exchanged among the
searchers").
160 Id. at 277-78 ("[A] patent system lowers the cost for the owner of technological
information of contracting with other firms possessing complementary information and
resources.... [Negotiating for secrets is difficult and the] patent creates a defined set of legal rights
known to both parties at the outset of negotiations.").
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cost of maintaining control over technology."' 16 1 His prospect theory of patent law
provided a partial normative justification for the patent system based on the reduction
of certain public costs. In addition, Clarisa Long's work suggests that patent law saves
other public costs by facilitating the disclosure of information to markets. 162 Although
traditional disclosure theories emphasize the economic value of secrets revealed in
patent applications, she argues that information revealed about the patenteefirm may
be just as valuable to the market. 163 To the extent that the cost of persuasively
communicating valuable information to capital markets is lowered through the patent
system, patent law clearly has another identifiable economizing function.
The role of patents in effecting affirmative asset partitioning and addressing
team-production-monitoring problems suggests two additional important
economizing functions. The patent system lowers the cost of transferring information
assets by establishing a recordation system that enables transferees to take title free
from the claims of creditors and heirs of the transferor. 164 More importantly, patents
lower the cost of monitoring the team production of information assets. Patent rules
deter opportunistic behavior at a lower cost than trade secrecy and facilitate the
creation of mediating hierarchs that can efficiently address issues of both opportunism
and compensation. 165 Like the contributions noted by Kitch and Long, the reduction
of private costs identified in this article translate easily into public benefits. The
aggregate savings identified in the transaction costs theory of patent law may well be
significant enough to justify the creation and maintenance of a patent system even if
the traditionally identified costs (occasional monopoly effects) and traditional benefits
(invention, commercialization, and disclosure) merely balance themselves out. It is
certainly a useful justification in a world where economists themselves remain
agnostic about the overall welfare effects of the patent system.
Finally, since the savings identified in this essay are likely to be significant, they
are worth accounting for in the debates which have been raging over reforming the
patent system.166 One focus of those debates is the reliability of the Patent Office.1
67
161 Id. at 279.
162 See supra notes 13-14, 26-27, and accompanying text.
163 Id.
164 See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 70-121 and accompanying text.
166 See generally Symposium, Patent System Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727 (2002).
167 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763,797 (2002) ("It is widely recognized that the Patent Office grants overly
broad patents since it has deficient knowledge of the relevant prior art."); see generally Mark D.
Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S.
Patent Law, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997) (suggesting improved patent office proceedings
would be better than resolving disputes over validity in court). See also Patent Reform and the
Patent and Trademark Office Reauthorization for Fiscal Year 2000 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 88 (1999)
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The Patent Office has been accused of issuing numerous suspect patents, prompting
calls to tighten scrutiny by patent examiners. 168 These calls have been resisted by
some who suggest that the federal courts are a more efficient place for making
primary determinations of patent validity. 169 One lesson from post-1982 empirical
studies is that patenting behavior is very sensitive to the perceived enforceability of
issued patents. Ifpatent validity rates start to go down, then we should also see a drop
in patent applications. The less reliable a title registration system is, the less it will be
used. To the extent that the system makes possible significant cost savings over its
altemative-trade secrecy-then calls for reform should consider fine tuning from the
transactional perspective. 170
For example, F. Scott Kieff has suggested the adoption of a "soft-look"
registration system that would include rule changes to encourage better drafting by
patentees. 17 1 Jay Kesan, on the other hand, has advocated tougher scrutiny of patent
applications by the Patent Office. 172 Tim Muris, Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission, has endorsed widening the availability of third party challenges to
patent applications. 173 Kieft s proposal is probably most sensitive to maintaining the
(statement ofRonald J. Stem, President, Patent Office Prof'l Ass'n) ("Patent examination needs to
be enhanced by providing more time for examination."). The Commissioner of the PTO suggested
as early as 1994 that "[w]e are going to have to re-engineer the Patent and Trademark Office so
that we give [examiners] more time and more resources. That has a price tag." George Leopold,
Congress, PTO Ponder Ways to Streamline Operation, ELECTRoNIc ENGINEERING TIMES, Aug. 1,
1994, at 1.
168 See generally Merges, supra note 135 (arguing for new procedures, such as a patent
opposition system, and a reform of the way patents are examined); John R. Thomas, Collusion and
Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305,
316-22 (stating that insufficient prior art samples has led to issuance of too many invalid patents);
Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, THE STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1999, at
http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,4296,00.html (asserting that workloads and
incentives at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are a significant contributor to the increase in
issuance of "bad patents").
169 See generally Mark Lemley, RationalIgnorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495 (2001) (arguing that reliance on the federal judiciary as the primary check on bad patents is
less costly than improving the examination procedure in the Patent Office). Contra Craig Allen
Nard, Legitimacy and the UsefulArts, 10 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 515,557 (1997) (suggesting that the
PTO is better suited to resolve patent validity issues than a judge or lay jury).
17 0 See Kesan, supra note 167, at 797 (suggesting strategies to "put in place incentives and
mechanisms to create a better-informed Patent Office that is more likely to grant patents
commensurate with innovation").
171 See F. Scott Kieff, THE CASE FOR REGISTERING PATENTS AND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
PREsENT PATENT-OBTAINING RuLEs (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series,
Discussion Paper No. 415, 2003).
172 Kesan, supra note 167.
173 See FTC Recommends Changes to Patent Laws to Ease Path to Overturning Invalid
Patents, 72 U.S.L.W. 2251 (2003).
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transactions-costs savings present in the current system. By ratcheting up scrutiny in
the Patent Office itself, the reforms of Muris and Kesan would raise the cost of
prosecuting a patent and might perhaps chill the use of the system. Making
registration easier under Kieff's soft-look approach would invite more applications,
some of them undoubtedly bogus, but he seeks to provide incentives for improper
applicants to weed themselves out. Any of these suggestions is probably superior to
approaches that would result in increased judicial invalidation of registered patents
and its attendant uncertainty.
Regardless of the merits of any particular reform proposal, the focus of the debate
should be shifted away from arguments about whether current patent office procedure
encourages or discourages invention and innovation. Policymakers should consider
reforming the patent title registration system in the same terms as they might consider
reforming an automobile title registration system. The focus should be on the cheap,
useful, and clear delineation of property rights. From time to time, automobile title
systems have been reformed to become more useful to those who want to transfer
rights to vehicles, 174 but no one, rightly, ever thinks it relevant to spend too much
time deciding whether those reforms will encourage or discourage invention and
innovation in the auto industry.
1 7 4 See, e.g., Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act (NUCUSL
1955).
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